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We investigate the effects of risk perception in a simple model of epidemic spreading. We assume
that the perception of the risk of being infected depends on the fraction of neighbors that are ill.
The effect of this factor is to decrease the infectivity, that therefore becomes a dynamical component
of the model. We study the problem in the mean-field approximation and by numerical simulations
for regular, random and scale-free networks. We show that for homogeneous and random networks,
there is always a value of perception that stops the epidemics. In the “worst-case” scenario of a
scale-free network with diverging input connectivity, a linear perception cannot stop the epidemics;
however we show that a non-linear increase of the perception risk may lead to the extinction of the
disease. This transition is discontinuous, and is not predicted by the mean-field analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In spring 2006, the potential threat of bird flu domi-
nated headlines in UK newspapers. On 26 March 2006
The Sun has called it “the day we all dreaded”, while
the Guardian says avian flu is “almost certain to spread
to wild birds across the UK”. The Daily Telegraph adds
that the most likely human victims will be poultry farm-
ers, who will be bankrupted. But the Mirror calls for
calm, saying people have a better chance of winning
the lottery than catching the virus. Interestingly, given
a certain amount of clustering of wealth residents and
correlation between wealth and readers preference, this
would translate into a differently informed neighborhood.
When the epidemic is over its peak or other news has just
peaked or media has “cried wolf” too many times over un-
founded health scares, there is a quick drop in the atten-
tion to that disease (something similar is reported nowa-
days for HIV). In other parts of the world, for example
Indonesia, a country with 18000 islands, people reacted
differently to the bird flu epidemics. Despite awareness
campaigns in the media and even door-to-door visits in
some of the islands, many Indonesians remained oblivi-
ous to the dangers of being in contact with diseased birds,
and aware of the need to inform the authorities and im-
plement a cull. Note that awareness campaigns, such as
during the SARS epidemics, are expensive and may result
in culling, reductions in commerce, travels and tourism.
The media hype over epidemics threat has a close sim-
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ilarity in how worried or fatalist, resilient, skeptical or
cheeky may be friends and neighborhood. Therefore, the
individual perception of the risk of becoming infected is a
key factor influencing the spreading of an epidemics and,
toward realistic inference, epidemiological models should
incorporate such parameter [1].
In order to investigate the effect of risk perception in
influencing the spreading of a disease, let us start from
simple, yet meaningful models, such SIS or SIR ones.
These models are defined on a network where individu-
als or groups of individuals corresponds to the nodes and
links represent social contacts and relationships among
them. Most of classical studies used either a regular lat-
tice, or a random one. Both of those choices are charac-
terized by a well defined value of the mean connectivity
〈k〉, and small variance 〈k2〉 − 〈k〉2. As shown by Watts
and Strogatz [2], the simple rewiring of a small fraction
of links in an otherwise regular lattice results in a sudden
lowering of the diameter of the graph, without affecting
the average connectivity or the degree of clustering. This
small world effect manifests itself in a dramatic short-
age of the distance between any two individuals, almost
without affecting the local perception of the network of
contacts. The consequences for epidemics spreading are
important: just a few long-distance connections may pro-
mote the spreading of a disease in rural areas, whereby
an epidemic would otherwise diffuse very slowly.
However, the investigations of social networks have
shown that they are quite different from regular and ran-
dom graphs [3, 4]. The probability distribution of con-
tacts often exhibits a power-law behavior (P (k) ∝ k−γ),
with an exponent γ between two and three [5, 6]. This
distribution is characterized by a relatively large number
2of highly connected hubs, which are presumably respon-
sible for epidemics spreading. Moreover, such distribu-
tions have a diverging second moment 〈k2〉 for γ ≤ 3 and
a diverging average connectivity 〈k〉 for γ ≤ 2.
The influence of the connectivity on the spreading dy-
namics is well outlined by a simple mean-field analysis.
Let us consider for the moment a tree with fixed con-
nectivity k. In a SIS model with immediate recovery
dynamics, a single infected individual may infect up to k
neighbors [7], each one with probability τ . The temporal
behavior of the mean fraction c of infected individuals is
given by
c′ =
k∑
s=1
(
k
s
)
cs(1 − c)k−s(1− (1− τ)s), (1)
where c ≡ c(t), c′ ≡ c(t + 1) and the sum runs over the
number s of infected individuals. The basic reproductive
ratio R0 [8] is simply given by R0 = kτ , so that the
epidemic threshold R0 = 1 corresponds to τc = 1/k.
This means that for a fixed connectivity, only diseases
with an infectivity less than 1/k do not spread.
In heterogeneous networks (nodes with different con-
nectivity) the mean field analysis, reported in Section III,
gives τc = 〈k
2〉/〈k〉. In the case 〈k2〉 ≃ 〈k〉2, τc is again
equal to 1/〈k〉.
In summary, the result is that on very non homoge-
neous networks, with diverging second moment 〈k2〉 (and
even worse on those with diverging average connectivity
〈k〉), a disease will always spread regardless of its intrinsic
morbidity [9].
This result can be modified by the assortativity degree
of the network and by the presence of loops, not consid-
ered in tyhe mean-field analysis. In networks with as-
sortative connections (hubs are preferentially connected
to other hubs), it may happen that epidemics spread for
any finite infectivity even when the second moment is not
diverging [10, 11], while for disassortative networks the
reverse is true, epidemics may be stopped by lowering the
infectivity with random vaccination campaigns, even in
the presence of a diverging second moment [10]. This is
particularly evident in networks lacking the small-world
property (consequence of high disassortativity) [12, 13].
In small-world networks with diverging second mo-
ment, it is quite difficult to stop an epidemics. The most
common recipes are vaccination campaigns (removal of
nodes) or modification of the social structure (removal
of links), that mathematically corresponds to site and
bond percolation problems. To be efficient, a vaccination
camping must be targeted to hubs, either directly [3] or
implicitly, for instance by exploiting the fact that hubs
are the most probable neighbors of many nodes [14].
The modification of the social structure can be ob-
tained by cohercitive methods (quarantine, etc.) or by
rising alerts so to modify travelling and business patterns,
but this option may be so expensive that the amount of
money put into restoring the previous situation may ex-
ceed that used to cure ill people [15].
However, epidemics in modern world are relatively un-
common, and most of them are stopped quite easily in
spite of the presence of high network connectivity. The
existence of an epidemic threshold on such networks has
motivated the investigation of the effects of connectivity-
dependent infectivity [16, 17, 18]. In this latter case,
most of investigations have been performed using mean-
field techniques, thus disregarding the presence of loops.
Loops are irrelevant at and near the percolation thresh-
old [19], and therefore one can threat the network as a
tree in these conditions. However, for processes evolving
on percolating networks, this assumption may not hold.
At present, the basic models used do not take into
consideration the knowledge that all human beings have
nowadays about the mechanisms of diffusion of diseases.
In fact, even in the absence of vaccination campaigns,
a disease that manifests itself in a visible way induces
modifications in the social network: lower frequency of
contacts (usage of mass transportation systems), higher
level of personal hygiene, prevention measures (masks),
etc. Indeed, recent works stress the importance of us-
ing a time-dependent bare infectivity to reproduce real
patterns of epidemics [20, 21, 22, 23].
Viruses with high mutation rates (like computer
viruses) follow a dynamics which is more similar to SIS
than to SIR [24], even in the presence of immuniza-
tion. On the other hand, the origin of vaccination come
from cross-immunization conferred by strains with lower
pathogenicity.
We shall study here a SIS model in which the bare
infectivity of the spreading agent is modulated by a term
that tries to model the effects of the perception of the
risk of being infected.
We assume that this perception is just an increas-
ing function of the fraction of ill people in the neigh-
borhood, given that the illness presents visible symp-
toms. This assumption is modeled after the heuristic-
systematic information-processing model [25], that sim-
ply states that attitudes are formed and modified as peo-
ple gain information about a process. In the absence of
explicit alarm or communication, the only way of gain-
ing this information is though examination of people in
the neighborhood. Individuals can process information
in two ways: either heuristically, using simple an semi-
unconscious schemes, or carefully examining them in a
rational way. Investigations about the effects of adver-
tisements, especially those exploiting fear, show that the
first way is rather common and predictable, except in the
limit of high level of fear, that may induce repulsion to-
wards the brand, or very low level, that may trigger the
reflexive mechanism and a more careful evaluation of the
message.
In this work we simply assume that the local infor-
mation (not enhanced by alarms) about the incidence
of the illness translates into a lowering of the infection
probability, implementing only the “linear part” of the
information-processing model. In principle, is possible
to compare the effective susceptibility to infection for
3diseases that manifest themselves in a visible and in an
invisible way and test experimentally this hypothesis.
In our model, the infectivity is a dynamical quan-
tity. Although the idea of modulating the infectivity of
the infection process is not new, it is generally studied
(mostly in the mean-field approximation) as as a function
of time [20, 21, 22, 23], of connectivity [16, 17] and/or
depending on the total infection level [26, 27]. In this
latter approach, a nonlinear growing dependence of the
infection rate on the total number of infected people may
originate bifurcation and chaotic oscillations.
As we shall show in the following, mean-field analysis
may not capture the essential phenomena in highly con-
nected networks. Moreover, we study the case of decreas-
ing infection rate with increasing local infection level,
that might also induce chaotic oscillations at the mean-
field level (See Ref. [28] and Section II). However, one
should consider that chaotic oscillations on networks eas-
ily desynchronize, and the resulting “microscopic chaos”
is quite different from the synchronous oscillations pre-
dicted by mean-field analysis [29], that may nevertheless
be observed in lattice models the presence of long-range
coupling [30].
We explicitly describe the model in Section II, analyze
it using mean-field techniques in Section III and study
numerically its behavior on different types of networks in
Section IV. Conclusions and perspectives are drawn in
the last section.
II. THE MODEL
In this paper we study the dynamics of an infection
spreading over a network of N individuals. We use
different kinds of networks: regular, with long-range
rewiring [2], random and scale-free [5]. The network
structure is considered not to depend on the infection
level.
Let us denote by P (k) the probability distribution of
connectivity k. We shall denote by z = µ1(P ) the average
connectivity (first moment of the distribution), z = 〈k〉 =∑
k kP (k), and by µ2 and µ2 = z
2. The rewiring of the
network is performed by starting from a regular lattice
in one dimension, detaching a fraction p of links from
one end and attaching them to randomly chosen nodes.
The regular case is studied numerically in one dimension.
Simulations on the rewired network are performed both
in the quenched and in the annealed cases.
For random graphs, studied only at the mean-field
level, the probability distribution is assumed to be Pois-
sonian,
P (k) =
zke−z
k!
,
corresponding to drawing Nz links at random among the
N nodes (µ2 = z).
The scale-free network that we study numerically is
asymmetric: each node i has a certain number kin(i) of
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FIG. 1: Distribution of input and output connections for the
scale-free network used in simulations.
input contacts and kout(i) of output ones, and was grown
using the following rule.
We start with a ring of K nodes, and we add the
other N − K nodes by choosing, for each of them,
K connected nodes jn, n = 1, . . . ,K, with probability
kin(jn)/
∑N
l=1 kin(l) (preferential attachment). The node
being attached is added to the inputs of the chosen nodes.
We also choose another node at random and add it to the
list of input nodes of the new node. This process simu-
lates the growing of a social network in which a new node
(a family or an individual) is born from another one (the
ones that is added as input of the newborn node) and
joins the society according with the popularity of nodes.
Our procedure allows to generate a network that has a
power-law distribution of input contacts, Pin(k) ≃ k
−γ ,
with γ ≃ 2 (see Figure 1), while the distribution of out-
put connections, Pout(k), is found to be exponentially
distributed. This is an interesting feature of the model
as the input connections represent the total number of
contacts to which an individual is exposed, while the out-
put connections represent the actively pursued contacts,
e.g. familiar ones. A customer, for instance, is exposed
to a large number of obliged contacts, and may become
infected with a large probability. These are considered
“input” links. On the other hand, people in a public po-
sition is more monitored, and it is not plausible that they
can infect a comparable large number of people. Infec-
tion is limited to the private sphere, where contacts are
more intense. These are the “output” links. We choose
this algorithm in order to have a “worst-case” scenario,
with an exponent corresponding to a diverging average
of input connectivity
We have not studied the case of dynamic dependence
of the network on the infection level, however a high-level
of infection of a severe disease may surely induce changes
in the social network. It is reasonable to assume that, for
mild diseases (or diseases considered harmless, like most
of computer viruses), the social network is not affected
and only the level of prevention is increased.
In the present paper we assume the effects of the in-
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FIG. 2: Mean field return map for fixed connectivity z =
10, parameters H = 0, α = 1, τ = 1 and varying values of
precaution level J . The effect of risk perception (J) is to lower
the infectivity at high concentrations of infected individuals.
fection to be immediately visible, with no latency nor
“hidden infectivity”. We also assume as temporal unit
the time required to recover from illness without immu-
nization and thus we explore the case of a SIS dynamics.
An individual can be infected separately by each of
his neighbors with a probability τ per unit of time (see
Eq. (1)).
We model the effects of the perception of the risk of
being infected replacing the bare infection probability τ
with τI(s, k),
I(s, k) = exp
{
−
[
H + J
( s
k
)α]}
, (2)
where k is the number of neighbors of a given site and s
is the number of them that are ill.
We assume the perception of the risk of being infected
to depend on the fraction of infected individuals among
the neighbors, s/k, on the level of precaution measures
adopted, J , and on the use of special prophylaxis, α ≤
1. The quantity H models a global influence over the
population, either alarm of broadcasting media news, in
which case it could depend on the average level of the
infection. Its effect is that of reducing the bare infectivity
τ , so in the following we only consider the case H = 0.
For the moment, we consider α = 1; the role of this
parameter will be clear in the following. Differently from
Ref [17], in our model the infectivity is not exclusively
related to the connectivity.
The mean-field return map (for fixed connectivity z)
is shown in Figure 2. The effect of the introduction of
risk perception is evident: for high concentrations of in-
fected individuals the probability of being infected is di-
minished. Therefore, while for J = 0 and z > 1 there
is only one stable fixed point c = 1 (all individuals in-
fected), by increasing J one can have stable fixed points
c < 1, limit cycles and even chaotic behavior [28].
III. MEAN FIELD ANALYSIS
The simplest mean-field approximation of the evolu-
tion of disease on a network consists in neglecting corre-
lations among variables. This is essentially equivalent in
considering the evolution on a tree, i.e., in assuming the
absence of loops.
Let us denote with ck = ck(t) the probability of having
an infected site of degree k (with k connections) at time
t, and with c′k = ck(t+1) the probability at a subsequent
time step.
The mean evolution of the system is generically given
by
c′k =
∑
Ck
PC(k|Ck)PI(k, Ck)PH(Ck),
where Ck indicates the local configuration (degrees and
healthy status) at time t around a site of degree k.
PH(Ck) is the probability of occurrence of the healthy
status of such configuration, PC(k|Ck) is the probability
that the local configuration is connected to the site un-
der examination, and PI(k, Ck) is the probability that the
disease propagates in one time step from Ck to the site.
In our case, the local configuration is given by a
set of k nodes, of degree (n1, n2, . . . , nk), and status
(s1, s2, . . . , sk), where si = 0 (1) indicates that the
site i is healthy (ill). Thus Ck = (ni, si)
k
i=1 and
PH(Ck) =
∏k
i=1 c
si
ni
(1 − cni)
1−si since we assume decor-
relation among sites.
PC(k|Ck) depends on the assortativity of the network.
Let us define PL(n|k) as the probability that a site of de-
gree k is attached to a link connected to a site of degree
n. PL(n|k) is computed in an existing network as the
number of links that connects sites of degree n and k, di-
vided by the total number of links that are connected to
sites of degree k, and
∑
n PL(n|k) = 1. The detailed bal-
ance condition gives kPL(n|k)P (k) = nPL(k|n)P (n). For
non-assortative networks, PL(n|k) = φ(n), and summing
over the detailed balance condition one gets PL(n|k) =
nP (n)/z, where z is the average number of links per node,
z =
∑
k kP (k). Assuming again a decorrelated network,
we have
PC(k|Ck) =
k∏
i=1
PL(ni|k) =
k∏
i=1
niP (ni)
z
for non-assortative networks.
PI(k, Ck) is the infection probability. In the case with-
out risk perception, it is
PI(k, Ck) = (1− (1− τ)
s) ,
where s =
∑
i si. The risk perception is modeled by re-
placing τ with τ exp(−Js/k), which makes the equations
5hard to be managed analytically except in the limit of
vanishing infection probability ck → 0, for which only
the case s = 1 is relevant. We shall consider this point
later.
Putting all together, one gets
c′k =
∑
n1,n2,...,nk
s1,s2,...,sk
(
k∏
i=1
PL(ni|k)c
si
ni
(1− cni)
1−si
)
·
(
1−
∏
i
(1− τ)si
)
.
Using the relation
∑
x1,x2,...,xk
∏
i
f(xi) =
(∑
x
f(x)
)k
,
we obtain after some simplifications
c′k = 1−
(
1− τ
∑
n
cnPL(n|k)
)k
.
This expression could be obtained directly by noticing
that 1− c is the probability of not being ill, which corre-
sponds to the combined probability of not being infected
by any of the k neighbors. Neglecting correlations, these
are k independent processes (although they depend on
k). Each of these process is 1 minus the probability of
being infected, which is the sum, over all possible degree
n of the neighboring node, of the probability that it is
ill (cn) times the probability that is is connected to the
node under investigation, PL(n|k).
Let us denote by c the asymptotic value of c(t). As-
suming that the transition between the quiescent (c = 0)
and active (c > 0) is continuous, its boundary is given by
the values of parameters for which c′/c = 1 in the limit
c→ 0. In this limit
c′k ≃ kτ
∑
n
cnP (n|k),
and we can now consider the case with risk perception,
with τ replaced by τ exp(−J/kα).
In the case of non-assortative networks,
ck(t+ 1) = k
τ
z
exp
(
−
J
kα
)∑
n
cn(t)nP (n).
Calling a(t+1) =
∑
n cn(t)nP (n) (that does not depend
on k), we have ck(t) = (kτ)/z exp (−J/k
α) a(t) and thus
ck(t+ 1) = ck(t)
τ
z
∑
n
exp
(
−
J
nα
)
n2P (n).
The critical boundary is therefore given by
∑
k
exp
(
−
Jc
kα
)
k2P (k) =
z
τ
, (3)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Jc
τ
z=2
z=4
z=8
z=10
FIG. 3: The mean-field dependence of the critical value of
precaution level Jc with respect to the bare infectivity τ for
Poissonian networks, with average connectivity z and α = 1
from which one could obtain Jc as a function of τ (we re-
placed n by k for consistency with the rest of the paper).
In the case J = 0 (no risk perception), the formula gives
τc =
µ2
z
=
〈k2〉
〈k〉
,
which is a well-known result [9, 16].
In the case of fixed connectivity, P (k) = δkz, and for
α = 1
Jc = z log(τz). (4)
In the absence of perception (J = 0) one has τc = 1/z.
For Poissonian networks (random graphs),
P (k) ≃
zke−z
k!
Numerical integration of Eq. (3) for α = 1 gives the re-
sults shown in Figure 3. One can notice that for every
value of τ and finite average connectivity z, there is al-
ways a value of the precaution level Jc that leads to the
extinction of the epidemics.
For non-assortative scale-free networks with exponent
γ, P (n) ∝ n−γ , the sum in Eq. (3) diverges unless γ > 3,
irrespective of α.
This implies that at the mean-field level, any level of
precaution is not sufficient to extinguish the epidemics.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The mean-field approximation disregards the effects of
(correlated) fluctuations in the real system. Indeed, the
effects of random and/or long-range connections may dis-
rupt correlations. We found that the behavior of mi-
croscopic simulations with random rewiring, both in the
quenched and annealed version, is well reproduced by
60
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FIG. 4: Critical value Jc of the precaution level as a func-
tion of the base infectivity τ average connectivity k = 10 for
the Poissonian mean-field (P), fixed connectivity mean Field,
Eq. (4) (F), and numerically (N = 1000), for the annealed
rewired p = 1 (W) and regular one-dimensional (R) cases.
mean field simulations with a white noise term, with am-
plitude proportional to
√
c (1− c)N . The noise term (or
the fluctuations in microscopic simulations) may bring
the infection to extinction if the average (or mean-field)
oscillations come close to c = 0, as is often the case for
a choice of J for which chaotic behavior appears in the
mean-field approximation.
For regular (fraction of rewired links p = 0) and
rewired (p > 0) lattices, it is always possible to observe a
continuous transition towards a critical level Jc(τ), such
that the infection become extincted, for every value of
the bare infectivity τ , as shown in Figure 4.
For scale-free networks, we concentrated on the case
illustrated in Section II, which can be considered a worst-
case scenario (γ = 2, diverging second and first moments
of input distribution).
Simulations show that for α = 1 (Eq. (2)), there is
no value of Jc for which the infection may be stopped
(although not all population is always infected), for any
value of τ , in agreement with the mean-field analysis.
The investigation of nodes that are more responsible
of the spreading of the infection reveals, as expected,
that the nodes with higher input connectivity (hubs) stay
ill most of time, Figure 5. Notice that also nodes with
high input connectivity have finite output connectivity,
so the above relation is not trivially related to the infec-
tion level.
In real life, however, public service workers who are
exposed to many contacts (like medical doctors, for in-
stance) use additional safety measures. In order to in-
clude this effect in the model, we use the parameter α,
Eq. (2), that up to now have been set to one. The ef-
fect of this parameter is to increase the perception of
the risk (or the safety measures) for nodes with higher
connectivity. As shown in Figure 6, as soon as α < 1, a
finite critical value of Jc appears. The transition from the
0
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FIG. 5: Fraction of time spent ill (η) in the scale-free case, as
a function of k for K = 10, J = 10.
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FIG. 6: Dependence of the critical value of the perception, Jc,
as a function of the exposure-enhanced perception parameter
α, K = 4, τ = 1, N = 10000.
active (c > 0) to the absorbing (c = 0) state occurs sud-
denly, due to fluctuations. Essentially, nodes with high
connectivity may fail to be infected due to their increased
perception of the infection, and this stops efficiently the
spreading. This effect is similar to targeted immuniza-
tion, but is not captured by the mean-field analysis. It
is a dynamical effect over a network far from the perco-
lation threshold, and thus containing loops.
The transition may be a finite-size effect, related to the
unavoidable cut-off in the degree distribution for finite
populations, although simulations with populations from
N = 5000 up to N = 80000 do not show any systematic
change in the transition point.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have studied the effects of risk per-
ception in a simple SIS model for epidemics spreading.
These effects are modulated by two parameters, J and
7α, that reduce the infectivity of the disease as a func-
tion of the fraction of people in the neighborhood that
are manifestly ill. The first parameter modulates the lin-
ear response, while the second models non-linear effects
like the increasing of prevention due to a public exposed
role. We found that for fixed or peaked connectivity there
is always a finite value Jc of perception that makes the
epidemics go extinct. We studied the evolution of the
disease in a “worst case” social networks, with scale-free
input connectivity and an exponent γ ≃ 2, for which both
the average input connectivity and fluctuations diverge.
In this case a linear perception cannot stop the disease,
but we found that, as soon as the perception is increased
in a non-linear way (α < 1), the epidemics may get ex-
tincted by increasing the perception level. This latter
transition is not continuous and is presumably induced
by fluctuations in hubs. It may be due to the finiteness
of population.
The mechanism that we propose is somehow analogous
to vaccination of hubs, except that is is a dynamics effect
due to the local level of diffusion of the disease, and is not
exclusively related to local connectivity. We think that
a similar mechanism is at the basis of the robustness of
human population with respect to epidemics, even in the
absence of immunization procedures. One may speculate
if, in consequence of such robustness, humans have been
selected to exhibit visual signs of the most common dis-
eases, which certainly does not favors the spreading of
infective agents. Another common symptom of an illness
is the tendency to isolation, which again could be the
result of selection.
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